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INTRODUCTION

A company's descent into bankruptcy may result from one or
more troubling factors. Often the failing enterprise has adopted a poor
business model, been led by deficient management, or labored under
an unworkable capital structure. More often than not, a business
failure is also accompanied by a less-than-ideal corporate governance
structure within the organization. The failure to adopt an effective
corporate governance model often leads to a sterile, inactive board of
directors and may hasten a firm's demise. Conversely, proper
corporate governance may prevent a business's slide into Chapter 11.
Indeed, several studies have demonstrated a strong relationship
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between corporate performance and effective corporate governance.'
Board independence and equity ownership, along with the mantras of
good governance, can create an environment in which management is
effectively monitored and bankruptcy generally is avoided.
But what happens when an organization does fail?
Traditionally, the focus in Chapter 11 restructurings has been on
financial and managerial reform, largely ignoring equally important
issues of firm governance. Attention to governance concerns, however,
can greatly benefit firms emerging from bankruptcy. In
reorganization, a failed firm stands at a critical juncture at which it
must take a course of action that will ensure its successful revival.
This course of action must include the restructuring of its corporate
governance structure to incorporate, inter alia, both the election of
independent outside directors and the use of equity ownership to
incentivize these directors to effectively monitor management. In
order to promote the firm's sound future, the debtor must undertake
both this corporate restructuring and the traditional financial and
managerial restructuring that occurs during Chapter 11.
Business leaders within the firm, institutional investors, and
even bankruptcy judges can influence and encourage a firm's decision
to reform its governance structure. Indeed, many institutional
investors currently demand the placement of independent, outside
directors on the board prior to any infusion of additional capital.
Bankruptcy judges must utilize the feasibility requirement to inquire
into the firm's efforts at corporate governance reform, while the debtor
company must create the kind of vital board that is crucial to its
future survival and success. Whether on the road to or from
bankruptcy, firms will benefit from adopting an effective corporate
governance structure. The adoption of an independent board and an
equity ownership plan, as urged by governance theorists, is an
essential means of ensuring the firm's successful emergence from
reorganization, future survival, and performance.
Part I of this Article provides a general background to
corporate governance norms and the concepts of independence and
equity ownership. This part also explores the relationship between
these mechanisms, effective governance, and corporate success. Part II
See Sanjai Bhagat, Dennis C. Carey & Charles M. Elson, Director Ownership, Corporate
1.
Performance, and Management Turnover, 54 BUS. LAW. 885, 917 (1999); Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira
M. Millstein, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded
Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1317-18 (1998). For a compilation of studies and
scholarship related to this topic, see generally D. JEANNE PATTERSON, CONFERENCE BOARD, REP.
NO. 1276.00-RR, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE (2000).
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briefly discusses the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy model, which
has focused on managerial and financial restructuring. After this
review, the case is made for the inclusion of corporate governance
reform as part of the overall effort to revitalize the corporation. In
Part III, these concepts are applied to the reorganization of the
Loewen Group, in which several corporate governance reforms were
implemented as part of the firm's emergence from Chapter 11. The
Article concludes with a call for a reassessment of the role of corporate
governance reform during Chapter 11 reorganization.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PREBANKRUPTCY
In the wake of Enron, Adelphia, Tyco, Worldcom, and other
corporate debacles, the importance of sound corporate governance
principles and their consistent application has become increasingly
apparent. Active monitoring of corporate executives by boards of
directors, in order to prevent mismanagement and malfeasance, is an
essential means of repairing the damage done to market valuations
and market integrity by recent scandals, as well as preventing their
2
recurrence.
Modern corporate governance theory advocates the use of
equity ownership and independence as mechanisms to motivate and
enable the board of directors to monitor the management of the
corporation actively. Although in theory the board was designed to be
an active management-monitoring intermediary and a fiduciary of the
shareholders, in reality boards often diverge from this ideal.3 For
much of the last century, the board of directors was commonly viewed
as an unimportant, almost ancillary body composed of management
retainees who had little sense of accountability to shareholders. 4 Some

2.
Not only are corporate governance rules of paramount importance in ensuring the
integrity of the corporate system in the United States, but they also have a profound influence on
corporate governance worldwide and serve as a model for new legislation in emerging markets.

See Gerard Hertig, Corporate Governance in the United States as Seen from Europe, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 27, 28 (1998).

3.
Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's Legacy: The Limits of
Judicially Enforced Constraintsand the Promise of ProprietaryIncentives, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127
(2002); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1057-58 (1996) (citing ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS,

THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-16 (rev. ed. 1968)); Charles M. Elson,
The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1995)
[hereinafter The Duty of Care]; Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based
Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1993).
4.
See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes
but UncertainBenefits, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 349, 352 (2000).
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even referred to directors as the parsley on the corporate fish. An
interesting anecdote illustrating the validity of this traditional view
involved the Penn Central Railroad bankruptcy in the early 1970s.
One commentator reported that the Penn Central board of directors
only learned of the company's bankruptcy reorganization filing from
newspaper accounts, as the decision to file was made exclusively by
management.5
As the modern corporate environment evolved, however,
commentators perceived that new mechanisms were needed to govern
public corporations in order to encourage both management
effectiveness and accountability to shareholders. 6 Importantly,
commentators and shareholders began to view the board of directors
7
as a tool to combat inactive, inefficient, and self-dealing management.
Moreover, as the prevailing political, financial, and corporate
environment underwent drastic changes, so too did the normative
precepts of solid corporate governance. For example, as the hostile
takeover boom of the 1980s altered the landscape of corporate culture,
courts and legislatures felt pressured to adopt new restraints on
corporate action.8 In the wake of this unprecedented activity, the
traditional principles of corporate governance underwent a similar
substantial revision. 9 More recently, legal and business commentators
have called for more fundamental corporate governance reform. These
commentators, including one of the authors of this Article, have
focused primarily on the independence of directors and long-term
director equity ownership. This approach has become central to
modern corporate governance theory, and the persistent need for its
application not only prebankruptcy, but more importantly, in Chapter
11 corporate restructurings is the central focus of this Article.
In many of America's largest corporations, management is
supervised by a board of directors who are largely appointed by
5.
See id.
6.
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest? The ALI Principles of
CorporateGovernance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871, 872-73 (1993).
7.
In particular, this response was provoked by management's insulation from the market
for corporate control. Along with staggered boards and other takeover defenses, poison-pill
provisions were adopted by several boards in the 1980s. To substitute for the discipline of the
market, shareholders and corporate law turned to board composition, compensation, and
independence as means to ensure alignment of managerial and ownership interests. See sources
cited supra note 3.
8.
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Although the corporate
governance reforms adopted here were chiefly internal in nature, they represented a dramatic
departure from traditional norms.
9.
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 6, at 872-73 (noting that "[e]very generation seems to h ave
its corporate law debate, and ours is no exception").
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management. 10 This highly undesirable situation-in which board
members owe their positions to executive largesse--creates an
environment in which corporate directors have little incentive to
monitor management but great reason to acquiesce to any
management initiative. The resulting passivity, commonly referred to
as "management capture,"" eliminates spirited bargaining and
oversight from the director/management relationship due to both
board composition and incentive. Not only does this problem
precipitate
the
oft-discussed
management
overcompensation
12
dilemma, but, more generally, it leads to a complete lack of effective
management monitoring and results in poor corporate performance.
The outside directors must consider management initiatives, not from
the perspective of one engaged by and beholden to management, but
from the viewpoint of the stockholders whose interests they represent
and to whom they are legally responsible.
Although board passivity is commonly criticized as being at
odds with principles of sound corporate governance, there is little
agreement with respect to a viable solution. The modern judicial
response to the passivity problem is exemplified in the oft-cited
Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.13 The Van
Gorkom court ostensibly sought to put teeth in the traditional duty of
care imposed on directors. In doing so, the court focused on the board's
decisionmaking process itself, holding that the defendant board was
underinformed when it approved the sale of the company after a twohour meeting; the board was not entitled to rely upon the deferential
business judgment rule as a protection from liability. While the court
did not specify detailed procedures whereby a board may avail itself of
business judgment rule protection, the defendant board's
decisionmaking process instantly became a paradigm of improper
board action. Van Gorkom thus resulted in heightened emphasis on
board procedure and process. While Van Gorkom remains good law, it
is doubtful that the decision had a positive effect on the perennial
problem of board passivity.14 The Van Gorkom decision created an
10. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 178 (2nd ed. 2001)
(noting a 1991 study which found that 82% of board vacancies were filled as a result of
recommendations by the CEO).
11. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139-48 (1976).
12. See, e.g., The Duty of Care, supra note 3, at 654-67.
13. 488 A.2d at 893.
14. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 3, at 689 (questioning the effectiveness of the decision while
arguing instead for incentive-based changes to internal board structure: "[A]s a well-known
parable suggests, it is not the stick that compels acceptable behavior, but the carrot as incentive.
The Van Gorkom enhanced duty of care functions as an ineffective 'stick'; we must replace it with
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even greater emphasis on form over substance. The real solution to
the board passivity problem involves stimulating effective board
oversight from within the boardroom itself. Good corporate governance
requires attention to structural incentives for director accountabilityfor example, installing independent directors and equity-based
director compensation.
Reliance on truly independent directors is central to modern
corporate governance theory outside of bankruptcy. The board's role is
to monitor management for the benefit of shareholders. Effective
monitoring is nearly impossible if the monitor does not possess
objectivity-objectivity that is best fostered through a strong,
independent board of directors. Active monitoring also promotes
greater management accountability and performance. The salient
point here is simple: To promote effective conduct, management must
be accountable to someone. This accountability does not materialize
unless there is a vigilant intermediary independent of the examined
party. Independence thus promotes the kind of board objectivity
necessary to properly review management, and this objectivity in turn
promotes thoughtful and careful decisionmaking by management.
Modern corporate governance theory has emphasized the need
for directors to hold an equity stake in the corporation. While
independence promotes objectivity, the board also must have an
incentive to exercise that objectivity effectively. Granting board
members equity ownership in the corporation may help achieve this
goal. When management appoints the board, and directors have no
stake in the enterprise other than their board seats, there is simply no
personal pecuniary incentive to engage in the active monitoring of
management. As directors shirk their duty to monitor management
actively, stockholder interests are left unprotected. The most effective
way to incentivize directors to address their responsibilities from the
perspective of the shareholders, to whom they are responsible, is to
make them stockholders as well. By becoming equityholders, the
outside directors assume a personal stake in the success or failure of
the enterprise. When directors are active equity participants, they
have an incentive to monitor management's performance more
effectively, since poor monitoring may have a direct negative impact
upon their personal financial interests.
Of course, where stock ownership is insubstantial when
compared to the other private benefits associated with being a
a carrot."). Note that since the Van Gorkom decision, shareholders have been allowed to
exculpate directors for duty of care violations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(b)(7) (2001); see, e.g.,
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90-91 (Del. 2001).
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director, the motivational impact is bound to be minimal. For example,
in many large public corporations, outside directors do have a nominal
equity stake in the company, but receive far more substantial
compensation in the form of annual fees, which often exceed $90,000,
in exchange for attendance at a few board meetings per annum.' 5 Such
a compensation system, of course, is wholly inadequate to promote the
kind of personal incentive necessary to create an active board. To have
any sort of favorable impact on director behavior, the amount of stock
that each director holds must be substantial. Therefore, to align
director and shareholder interests and promote effective monitoring,
director fees should be paid primarily in restricted company stock.
It is important to note that while equity ownership provides
the incentive to monitor, it alone does not provide the proper
objectivity to foster effective oversight. Independence creates this
objectivity, and that is why modern governance theory demands both
equity ownership and independence. Independent directors without
equity ownership may be objective, but they have little incentive to
engage in active oversight. Equity ownership provides the incentive to
exercise objective oversight. On the other hand, equityholding
directors who are not independent may have the proper incentive but
lack the necessary objectivity. Independence and equity ownership,
acting in tandem, are the keys to effective corporate governance.
Sound corporate governance principles, such as independence
of corporate directors, are not only important in theory. Empirical
evidence has borne out their importance and effect on companies'
performance as well. For example, Ira Millstein, the noted corporate
governance lawyer, and Professor Paul MacAvoy of the Yale
University School of Management conducted an extensive study in
1998 that found substantial correlation between active, independent
boards and superior corporate performance. 16 Similarly, a 1999 study
conducted by one of the authors of this Article revealed a relation
between director stock ownership and "heightened corporate
performance."'1 7 Another commentator has noted that "[b]oard
18
ownership has ushered in a new era of management accountability."
15. See Pearl Meyer, Board Stock Ownership: More, and More Again, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Winter 1998, at 55-56 (stating that the approach to director pay has changed dramatically over
the last several years).
16. See MacAvoy & Millstein, supra note 1, at 1317-18; see also PATTERSON, supra note 1.
17. R. Franklin Balotti, Charles M. Elson & J. Travis Laster, Equity Ownership and the
Duty of Care: Convergence, Revolution, or Evolution?, 55 BUS. LAW. 661, 671-77 (2000); see also
Bhagat et al., supra note 1, at 917.
18. Meyer, supra note 15, at 55-56 ("Bringing directors into an ownership position has
stymied the inertia suffered by many boards, whose responsibility it is to hold management
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Given the theoretical
and empirical importance
of
independence and equity ownership, most commentators and
investors have supported the call for sound corporate governance prior
to bankruptcy. No one, however, has seen the restructuring that
occurs during Chapter 11 reorganization as an exceptional
opportunity to implement needed corporate governance reforms. In
combination with financial and managerial restructuring, these
reforms are an indispensable element of the "fresh start" the
corporation desires.

II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POSTBANKRUPTCY
When a corporation becomes unable to pay its debts as they
become due, bankruptcy law provides relief. The debtor company may
"restructure" its debt and make other amendments to its capital and
operating structure while temporarily shielded from the demands of
creditors. The traditional bankruptcy reorganization has focused
primarily on business and financial restructuring, but has ignored the
equally important considerations of corporate governance reform. 19
Reforms designed to increase the equity ownership and independence
of the board are vital to the directors' ability to monitor and ensure
corporate success.
A. The Existing Model: Financialand ManagerialRestructuring
The
first
recurring
theme
in
Chapter
11
reorganization-financial restructuring-is of primary interest to
bankruptcy attorneys and the bankruptcy court. This theme involves
an apportionment of economic interests in the estate between
creditors and shareholders, and the plan must be confirmed by a
bankruptcy court. 20 This negotiated process is the province of

focused on the well-being of shareholders and the corporation's other stakeholders ....Directors,
with their own investment on the line, are found to be more vigilant-more pro-active in meeting
potential problems head-on before trouble arises and snowballs.").
19. For example, one commentator observes that there has been a debate among scholars as
to whether reorganizing corporations should be governed chiefly for the benefit of shareholders
or creditors. See Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the

Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 767
(1993) (discussing corporate governance in the context of management versus shareholder power
during a reorganization). Hence, the traditional corporate bankruptcy dialogue has focused on
issues extraneous to the principles of corporate governance discussed above. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 677-79.
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creditors' committees, cramdown, and the formal "plan of
21
reorganization.,
Supplementing the financial restructuring, the debtor's
business plan concentrates on restoring the company to financial
health, not through debt restructuring, but through managerial
decisions aimed at producing a more efficient business entity. 22 For
example, a new business plan may call for the abandonment or sale of
unprofitable subsidiaries or firm components or a reduction in
expenses. 23 Though in many situations the debtor's former
management remains in office postfiling, management's power over
the creation of the new business plan for the debtor corporation is
checked by creditors and institutional investors. 24 What is lacking
from the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization is any serious
attention to the principles of sound corporate governance.
B. Updating the Model: CorporateGovernance Restructuring
In addition to the financial and managerial modifications that
the debtor undertakes, special-indeed, utmost-consideration should
be given to the restructuring of the firm's corporate governance model.
While defects in the monitoring function may not have been the sole
factor in the debtor's decline, there is little doubt that flaws in a firm's
board structure precipitate poor financial and managerial
performance. Given this causal link between monitoring and
operational outcomes prebankruptcy, serious consideration should be
given to reforming the corporate governance structure of the firm postbankruptcy. The plan of reorganization should include reforms
designed to augment both the independence and the equity ownership
of the board.
This corporate governance restructuring is necessary to the
realization of the debtor's "fresh start. ' 25 The debtor endeavors to right

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. This "fresh start" should not be confused with the individual debtor's "fresh start" under
the Bankruptcy Code. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 62 (3d ed. 2001). In
Chapter 11, future earnings of the corporation may be available to existing debtors, while in a
noncorporate bankruptcy, there is no such availability. The reference to "fresh start" here is
intended to refer to the ability of an otherwise profitable enterprise to receive the protection of
the Code in order to emerge from an unworkable financial capital structure. Regardless of the
technical differences, in bankruptcy the corporation is able to reevaluate and alter not only its
financial structure but also its operational and corporate governance design.
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itself through a series of reforms. Traditionally, these reforms have
included adjustments to the firm's financial and managerial models. A
proper governance structure translates into better monitoring,
improved managerial accountability, and enhanced performance longterm.
Historically, the board of directors has been vested with the
responsibility of monitoring management for the benefit of the firm's
residual owners, i.e., its stockholders. The separation of ownership
and control through the corporate form creates the potential for
agency costs. Agency costs include the detrimental effects of
opportunistic action by management and the expenditure of time and
resources required to address this problem. 2 6 Of the several
mechanisms that owners of the firm may utilize to reduce agency
costs, oversight by the board of directors stands as the primary
bulwark against managerial indiscretion. 27 When the board fails to
monitor effectively, disaster results-executive enrichment and
corporate failure ensue. To curb managerial opportunism and protect
against disastrous corporate performance, a firm must implement a
corporate governance model capable of effectively monitoring the
enterprise's operations.
This monitoring is especially relevant in the bankruptcy
context. As noted above, empirical studies have demonstrated an
intimate relationship between sound corporate governance and
superior financial and operational results. 28 Arguably, the nexus
between monitoring and performance becomes most relevant at the
time a corporation attempts to reemerge from bankruptcy. To
effectuate the contemplated financial and managerial reforms, a
corporation relies upon the efficacy and integrity of its management
and its ability to carry out the monitoring function.
Modern corporate governance theory emphasizes two major
factors that make the board an effective, active monitor: independence
and equity ownership. 29 As discussed in Part I, equity ownership gives
individual directors the incentive to monitor, while independence from
management makes this monitoring possible. Equity ownership
26.

JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 2.5 (1997).

27. Id. § 10.2. The expense of the board of directors is itself a component of agency costs. In
theory, at least, the marginal benefit of this monitoring mechanism exceeds its cost. The result is
a net decrease in agency costs. Other direct and indirect mechanisms available to stockholders
include audited financial reports, the certificate of incorporation, contractual obligations,
government regulation, external capital-market constraints, the specter of bankruptcy, and a
reduction in free cash flows.
28.

See supra note 1.

29.

See generally Elson, supra note 3, at 690-96.
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facilitates the alignment of the directors' interests with those of the
shareholders. Linking the fortunes of the directors and the
shareholders motivates the board to closely monitor the management
of the enterprise. Upon emergence from Chapter 11, this alignment
can ensure that the directors share the same interests as the new
equity investors. Often a restructuring will require a substantial
injection of capital in the form of additional equity. These investors,
who often take a substantial gamble on the renewal of the enterprise,
are not far removed from the dangers of corporate mismanagement. It
is therefore not surprising that several large, activist institutional
investors have demanded governance reforms as a condition precedent
to substantial reinvestment in the restructured business.
The equity stake of individual board members must reflect
certain attributes to ensure properly guided monitoring. An essential
characteristic is the long-term nature of the investment. Short-term
gains are driven by shortsighted strategy. To emerge from bankruptcy
successfully, the business must be able to focus on its long-term
horizon. Board members who have an incentive to monitor the
stockholders' investment over an extended time period will ensure
that management develops a corresponding strategy. In addition to
their stock being subject to resale restrictions, board members should
be required to personally invest in the corporate stock. This personal
investment, when combined with director compensation in the form of
stock, will motivate corporate monitors to ensure that management is
responsive to shareholder interests.
Equity ownership is a necessary, but not complete, promoter of
proper corporate monitoring. In addition to having a substantial stake
in the enterprise, the board must be independent from the
management team that is subject to its oversight. Independence
requires the severance of board members' economic ties to
management and the company (with the exception of the equity stake
itself). For oversight to be meaningful, it cannot be overridden by the
clouded and biased judgment of self-interested behavior. Similarly, the
majority of the board cannot be deeply involved in the day-to-day
operational decisions that it is supposed to objectively review,
challenge, and sometimes reverse. The directors overseeing
management action also must be appropriately dispersed among the
committees of the board and reasonably versed in financial reporting
methods. Finally, the outside directors should have some knowledge of
the business they are attempting to monitor and guide.
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Several means exist to create an effective board governance
structure. These reforms, which can be implemented during the
Chapter 11 transition, include:
o a substantial majority of independent outsiders on
the board; and its audit, compensation, nominating,
and governance committees solely comprised of
independent directors;
u predominantly equity-based director compensation;
o substantial long-term equity commitment to the
company by each outside director;
o annual election of the board;
a selection of board members based on industry
expertise and financial literacy; and
o restriction on the number of additional boards on
which the directors can serve.
These reforms can ensure the viability of the monitoring function and
can result in the long-term financial and operational health of the
enterprise that reemerges from Chapter 11.
Who should be charged with the responsibility of implementing these reforms? First and foremost, the board of directors that
operates during the reorganization process can plan to make these
changes. Additionally, institutional investors and creditors, through
the "power of the purse," can make activist demands of the board and
of senior management. By linking new infusions of cash with
corporate governance concessions, these investors can protect their
interests. Senior management, through its own influence over the
board, can also encourage the adoption of board equity ownership and
the nomination of independent outside directors. Finally, bankruptcy
judges may also intervene to promote the establishment of new
monitoring mechanisms. Through the feasibility requirement, the
bankruptcy court is charged with a sua sponte review of the debtor's
ability to successfully continue operations postconfirmation.3 0 Judges
may use this power to ensure that time and attention is directed not
just to the allocation of assets and capital, but also to the continued
ability of the firm to prosper and avoid future bankruptcy filings.
In the bankruptcy context, detached oversight can ensure that
management pursues the effective strategies necessary to the firm's
successful revival. An active board can both prevent the
mismanagement that led to bankruptcy and ensure the rehabilitation

30.
(1997).

See Hon. Leif M. Clark, Taking Feasibility Seriously, 1997 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 192
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of the enterprise. With an independent board overseeing its actions,
management will be spurred to thoughtful and reflective decisionmaking. Management becomes accountable to an intermediary that
represents shareholder interests. Without this accountability,
management may adopt strategies similar to those that led to the
firm's decline. In contrast, a watchful, objective monitor can ensure
that management is properly considering its business and investment
decisions and encouraging successful reemergence.
III. APPLICATION: THE LOEWEN BANKRUPTCY
The experience of the Loewen Group provides a rich
illustration of the importance of proper corporate governance both preand postbankruptcy. Prebankruptcy, Loewen's board of directors
seemingly lacked significant independence from management. Loewen
executed a poor business strategy and subsequently filed for
bankruptcy protection, which was arguably, at least in part, the result
of the board's ineffective monitoring of management. Once in
bankruptcy, in addition to its financial and, managerial restructuring,
the Alderwoods Group (the successor corporation) adopted a series of
corporate governance reforms designed to both rehabilitate the
business and prevent recurrence of its precipitous decline.
The Loewen Group, organized under the laws of British
Columbia, was a major player in the market for funeral homes and
cemeteries. 31 In 1998, Loewen owned and operated over 1,115 funeral
homes and 427 cemeteries throughout North America. 32 Loewen made
funeral, cemetery, and cremation arrangements, and provided various
other funeral services. Loewen also offered cemetery and lifeinsurance products, the latter of which primarily served to finance its
preneed funeral services.
The business expanded quickly through a series of acquisitions
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. 33 To finance several of
these acquisitions, the firm acceded to a -highly leveraged capital
structure. In addition to the strain created by this significant debt
load, the firm suffered from negative cash flow associated with its
preneed funeral service operations. Finally, a series of substantial
lawsuits dealt the funeral home and cemetery provider a "death blow"
in the mid-1990s. Consequently, Loewen filed a petition for creditor

31.
32.

THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC., SCHEDULE 14A PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 9, 1998).
THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC., FORM 10-K (Dec. 31, 1998)

33.

THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC., DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (Sept. 10, 2001).
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protection on June 1, 1999. The plan of reorganization was confirmed
by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in late
2001, and the firm emerged under the new moniker Alderwoods
Group, Inc. From its decline to its rebirth, Loewen Group underwent
substantial restructuring, including a series of corporate governance
reforms.
A. Prebankruptcy
Prior to bankruptcy, the Loewen board lacked substantial
independence from management. Insiders and directors who by
modern governance standards lacked sufficient independence
dominated the board. As of 1998, four of the fourteen members were
Loewen employees, while four of the remaining ten members had
34
relationships with the company that raised independence concerns.
Each director in the latter group had some financial tie to the
company. Outstanding examples of the composition of the board
included an ex-legislator who was the member of five other boards,
two clergymen, and a real estate company head-who held less than
five hundred shares of stock and missed several board meetings.
Raising questions of effective board oversight, management
boasted a number of now-controversial perquisites, including use of a
corporate yacht and aircraft, substantial executive loans, and
generous golden parachutes. Takeover threats were avoided through
the use of a staggered board and poison pill. 35 Two directors with
independence issues held spots on the four-person audit committee
and similarly sized corporate governance committee. In short, the
monitoring mechanism could most properly be termed problematic.

34. The board of directors included the President and Chief Executive Officer, the Executive
Vice President of Operations, the Senior Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer,
and the Chairman of the Board of a wholly owned international subsidiary. THE LOEWEN GROUP,
INC., supra note 31. Furthermore, several members of the board benefited from related
transactions with either Loewen or one of its subsidiaries. Id. Such arrangements included fees
for consulting services, presentations to management, leases for chapel premises, and
underwriting services. Included in this analysis were three nominees to the board. Id.
35. THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC., supra note 32. Takeover defenses frustrate the market for
corporate control, which, if left unfettered, can produce efficiency gains for management.
Insulation of the board can have a deleterious effect on the positive incentives produced by this
market.
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B. Postbankruptcy
Once in bankruptcy, Loewen committed to implementing
several corporate governance reforms. 6 All of the reforms were
initiated by the new chairman of the board with the strong support of
the institutional investor creditors. The new Alderwoods board
consists of nine members. A substantial majority of the new board is
completely independent of management and was selected on the basis
of a professional search process.8 7 These outside board members were
chosen for the various monitoring skills they brought to the table. The
group includes a Canadian investment manager, a retired insurance
executive, a retired consumer-products executive with substantial
marketing experience, a retired international accounting firm partner
with significant audit experience, an investment banker, a
valuation/reorganization expert, and a corporate governance legal
academic. 38 None of these outside directors has any form of consulting
or financial arrangement with the reorganized company or its
subsidiaries.
Going forward, it will be incumbent upon the newly composed
board to adopt the corporate governance guidelines that were
envisioned during Chapter 11. The annually elected board is currently
compensated with stock options, a retainer, and meeting fees that may
be paid entirely in company stock. With such a high number of outside
directors on the board, the owners of Alderwoods can be assured that
the firm's audit, compensation, and corporate governance committees
will be populated by truly independent members.
The key to a company's long-term success is an independent
board with long-term equity ownership. As discussed earlier,
independence gives directors objectivity in monitoring, while equity
ownership provides the incentive to exercise this function. The
Alderwoods board was constructed with this principle in mind. In the
end, this corporate governance restructuring, along with the other
financial and managerial reforms carried out in the bankruptcy
process, gives the company the best chance for long-term survival and
success. Corporate governance reform was an integral part of the
Loewen bankruptcy process and promises to play an important part in
the continuing corporate structure of Alderwoods and numerous other
companies that emerge from bankruptcy.
36. ALDERWOODS GROUP, INC., FORM 10-K (Mar. 28, 2002); THE LOEWEN GROUP, INC.,
supra note 33.
37. Only two of the nine directors are currently listed as executive officers of Alderwoods.
38. The academic noted is one of the authors of this Article.
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CONCLUSION

The historic functions of the board of directors were to hire and
fire management and to monitor the company for the benefit of
shareholders. This situation created a classic agency problem: Who is
monitoring the monitors? To solve this problem, modern corporate
governance emphasizes two central factors to make the board an
effective, active monitor: independence and equity ownership. These
mechanisms become especially important in the bankruptcy context.
As a firm reorganizes its financial and business structure, it should
also attach importance to corporate governance restructuring. The
implementation -of corporate governance reforms can ensure the
successful reemergence of the debtor and avoid the mismanagement
that preceded the bankruptcy in the first place. While it is too early to
tell if today's large failing corporations will implement meaningful
corporate governance reforms similar to those implemented by
Loewen as part of Chapter 11 restructuring, both empirical evidence
and common business sense suggest that they would be well advised
to do so. Such reform should help ensure a healthy reemergence from
the throes of bankruptcy and foster the development of a viable and
reformed corporation.

